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SELF-INCRINATION AND THE TWO SOVEREIGNTIES RULE
JiM THOMPSON
"The public has a right to every man's evidence,"
said Lord Chancellor Hardwicke over 200 years
ago. This power of the state to obtain evidence, by
compulsory process if necessary, is the very foundation of every criminal prosecution. It has, however,
been subject to various limitations developed
through the years by the common and statutory
law which recognize certain "privileges" against
the compulsion of testimony, e.g., the attorneyclient and physician-patient privileges. Courts
and legal scholars have long debated whether
legitimate policy reasons exist to justify the handicaps they place in the way of full and fair disclosure of the truth in court.' No privilege, however, has provoked the periodic examinations, the
"agonizing reappraisals" and calls for strengthening, modifying or abolishing the doctrine, especially in recent times, as has the privilege against
self-incrimination.'
This power to withold otherwise relevant and

often vital evidence has not gone unchallenged by
the state. The practice of granting immunity from
prosecution as a means of obtaining evidence which
ordinarily would be witheld under a claim of
protection against self-incrimination is. nearly as
old as the privilege itself.3 As Wigmore has pointed
out,4 since it is the state which imposes a penalty
as the consequence of committing a criminal act
it is within the power of the state to take away the
penalty by law. If the authorities decide that
obtaining the testimony of a witness in a particular
case is more important than prosecuting him for
any offense he might have committed they may
grant him immunity from prosecution and thereby
obtain his testimony despite his constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. 5 The imA good discussion of immunity statutes and their
history may be found in Rogge, Compelling The Testimony Of PoliticalDeviants, 55 Mica. L. Rxv. 163, 375

(1956-1957).

supra,note I at § 2281.
"Any evidence that he may give under such a
statutory direction will not be against himself, for the
reason that, by the very act of giving the evidence, he
becomes exempted from any prosecution or punishment
for the offense respecting which his evidence is given.
In such a case he is not compelled to give evidence
against himself in a criminal case, for the reason that the
legislature has declared that there can be no criminal
case against him which the evidence which he gives may
tend to establish." Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591,
604 (1896).
4 WsGMoR

I WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE

§

2251

(3rd Ed.

1940),

McCoascK, EviDENCE (1954).
2Inbau, Should We Abolish the ConstitutionalPrivilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 45 J. Crim. L., C. &
P. S., 180 (1954) and Giuswow, THE F 'ns _AamNMENT TODAY (1955).

Griswold says the fifth amendment has come to our
conciousness in the past few years and while it has
troubled many members of the, public, it is "one of the
great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself
civilized."

5
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munity granted must, of course, be fully consonant with the protection he obtains when he
refuses to testify under a claim of privilege. 6
The fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination was frequently claimed by witnesses
appearing in the many investigations into Communism in the United States which were conducted
by Congress in the early 1950's: Congress responded
to this mass use, and possible misuse, of a constitutional privilege by those who would overthrow
the government which guarantees it by passing
the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1954. The Act
offered immunity to persons testifying before a
congressional committee, the federal courts, and
grand juries in cases involving the national security
or defense of the United States.
Since the language of the Act was similar to that
found in an immunity statute upheld by the
Supreme Court in a case some 60 years earlier
it was generally assumed to be valid.8 Any doubts
on this score were dispelled when the Supreme
Court, in the first case to arise under the Act, and
concededly a test of it, held the Act constitutional.
That case was Ullmann v. United States,9 decided
in 1956.
Ullmann, the petitioner, had appeared before
a federal grand jury investigating wartime espionage and conspiracy to commit espionage. Asked
about his and others' connections with, and membership in, the Communist Party, he refused to
answer, claiming his fifth amendment privilege
against self incrimination. He was offered immunity under the Compulsory Testimony Act
but still declined to answer the questions and he
was sentenced for contempt of court. His appeal
to the Supreme Court alleged the unconstitutionality of the Act on a variety of grounds.
Most of the problems raised by the Ullmann
case have been considered elsewhere.10 One, however, presents a question having a significance
beyond the immediate application of the Act. Did
the Supreme Court, by its decision in the Ullmann
case, reopen to further examination the supposedly
6The Supreme Court in Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892) laid down the test for a valid
immunity statute. It must be, the Court held, "a
complete protection from all the perils against which
the constitutional prohibition was designed to
guard ...
768 STAT. 745 (1954), 18 U. S. C. 3486 (Supp.
II 1954).
8 The earlier case is Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591

(1896).

9 350 U. S. 422 (1956).
10Rogge, supra note 3 and Note, Immunity From
Self-Incrimination Under The Federal Compulsory
Testimony Act, 46 J. Crim. L., C. &P. S. 673 (1956).

well-settled federal rule that a witness in a federal
proceeding may not invoke the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination when theprosecution he fears is under state criminal law?
Ullmann contended that the immunity from
prosecution given by the Act did not extend to.
possible incrimination under the laws of a state.
If, in the course of his testimony concerning acts,
against federal law, the witness should be forced
to mention acts which were crimes against state
law he would be exposed to possible state prosecution. The fifth amendment required that he not
be forced to incriminate himself under either
federal or state law; he argued, the Act was deficient in this respect, and was, therefore unconstitutional. This contention was also raised in the
District Court." "The short answer to both questions," said that court, "is Murdock v. United
States."
Immunity From State Prosecution-A Retreat From
The Ride of Murdock?
The Mwrdockn case involved the question of
whether a witness testifying in afederalproceeding,
and with regard to a federal matter, could invoke.
his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to answer a question on the ground
that his answer might incriminate him under the
laws of another jurisdiction. In that case the witness
refused to disclose the names of persons to whom
he had made payments which he subsequently
deducted on his income tax return. A truthful
answer would have disclosed that he had made the
payments to state law enforcement officials as
bribes in order that he might run his gambling
businesses unhindered. The Court held that he
must answer the questions because a federal investigation could not be prevented by matters depending on state law and the fifth amendment protected only against disclosures which might lead to
prosecution by the federal government.
This is the "two sovereignties" rule. It embodies
a conception of two separate and distinct sovereigns, the federal government and a state government, "acting separately and independently of
3
each other, within their respective spheres."
Under this theory a witness could not invoke the
fifth amendment in a Federal court sitting in
Illinois, for example, because his answer to a
question'might incriminate him under the criminal
laws of that state, and even though he would
11 128

F. Supp. 617 (1955).
" United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
13Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1943).
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certainly be subject to the jurisdiction of Illinois
and the danger of a subsequent state prosecution
might be very real. The amendment protects only
againstdisclosures which might incriminatea witness
under the laws of the sovereign-thefederal government-on.which it is binding. One sovereign takes
no notice of the operation of the criminal laws of
another and is not dissuaded from action by matters depending upon them.
Since the "two sovereignties" rule of the Murdock case applies to the facts of the Ullmann case
as well, the contention of Ullmann that the immunity provisions of the Act did not extend to
state prosecutions was groundless, for under the
Murdock rule the immunity did not have to extend
that far. 14 There would, therefore, be no need to
reach the question of whether the federal government had the power to bar state prosecutions for
violations of state criminal law-an admittedly
grave constitutional question. This was the govern5
ment's contention in Ullmann.
Though the issue of the applicability of the
"two sovereignties" rule was squarely raised by
both Ullmann and the government, and though
the district court considered this the "short
answer" to the whole problem, the Supreme
Court did not mention the Murdock case, did not
discuss the "two sovereignties" rule, but went
instead to the second question and held that the
federal government indeed had the power to bar
state prosecutions for offenses against the state
which were disclosed by the witness while he was
under the compulsion of a federal immunity
statute. This was so, the Court declared, because
Congress had the power to provide for the national
defense. Federal immunity was a "necessary and
proper" method of carrying that object into effect
and was, therefore, the "supreme law of the land"
by which state courts were bound.
Sound though this holding may be, it cannot be
denied that it poses something of a threat to the
independence of the state judiciary in matters
heretofore considered to be within their exclusive
control. The federal government has supreme
power in many areas other than national defense.
Interstate commerce, bankruptcies, naturalization,
14"The principle established is that full and complete immunity against prosecution by the government
compelling the witness to testify is equivalent to the
protection furnished by the rule against compulsory
self-incrimination." United States v. Murdock, 284
U.S. 141, 149 (1931).
15 Brief for Appellees, pp. 31-33, Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
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the postal service, foreign affairs, and regulation
of U. S. currency may be mentioned. Immunity
laws may now be enacted to deal with the problems arising under these powers and their prohibition of prosecution can constitutionally extend to
the state courts.'

No Supreme Court Justice has been more unwilling to decide constitutional questions when
not necessary to the decision of a case than Justice
Frankfurter who wrote the opinion of the Court
in Ullmann:
"In reaching out for a constitutional adjudication, especially one of such moment, when a statutory solution avoiding it lay ready at hand, the
Court... disregard(s) its constantly professed
principle for the proper approach toward congressional legislation."' 7
In the light of these conclusions, why did the
Court ignore the Murdock case when that decision
was dearly applicable to the facts in Ullmann?
Why did they decide a constitutional issue of some
moment when the mention of a case name would
have sufficed? It is submitted that the Murdock
case was wrongly decided and, because of the
Supreme Court's avoidance of the issue in Ullmann, the principle which Murdock laid down is
now open to question.u An analysis of the cases
16The problem is discussed in legislation, The
Federal Immunity Statute And Its Potential For Protecting The Witness Against State Prosecution, 16 U.
Prrr.
L. REv. 61 (1954).
7

SShapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 37 (1948)
(dissenting opinion). And see Ashwander v. TVA,
2978 U.S. 288,341(1936) (concurring opinion).
1 In Tedesco v. United States, 255 F.2d 35 (1958),
the appellant advanced the position that "the impact of
recent Supreme Court decisions has eroded the Murdock
doctrine," citing the Ullmann case. He argued "the
failure of the Supreme Court specifically to affirm the
Murdock doctrine in the Ullmann case. He argues that
the Murdock opinion was an easy answer to the issue
before the highest tribunal and would have made it
unnecessary to pass upon the constitutional power of the

Congress to grant immunity from prosecution in state

courts under state law."
The Sixth Circuit refused to accept this argument,
concluding that Congress had a right to extend protection to the witness beyond the minimum constitutional requirements. If Congress undertook to do so,
the court reasoned, the Supreme Court in Ullmann did
not reach the question of whether it had to when it
considered the constitutionality of the grant of immunity in state courts.
This view ignores the fact that at least one house of
Congress, the Senate, was extremely uncertain as to
whether it should, could, or did bar state prosecutions.
See 99 CoNG. REc. 4742-4743, 8340-8357 (1953).

"I think it is important... that we make clear that
this bill, at least, in the opinion of the Judiciary Committee and of its able counsel, would not grant to a
witness immunity from prosecution in a state court....

1958].
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might give in the case would incriminate them
under the laws of Virginia. Chief Justice Marshal]
upheld this contention."
The question was not raised again until Brown v.
WalkerP The witness in that case, the first case to
uphold a federal immunity statute and the leading
case relied upon for the decision in Ullmann, appeared before a federal grand jury investigating
violations of the Interstate Commerce Act. He
refused, although under a grant of immunity similar to that in Ullmann, to answer any questions.
One reason put forward for his refusal was that
the immunity afforded him did not extend to
prosecutions under state law. The Court held
that the witness's immunity did extend to possible
state prosecutions" and added, in dictum, that
the witness's fears of state incrimination were
groundless.2
"This case has been misinterpreted as one in which
the federal court was merely administering state law
and the question of incrimination under the laws of
another jurisdiction was not involved. Professor Corwin, Corwin, The Supreme Court's ConstructionOf The
Sdf-Incrimination Clause, 29 MicH.L. REv. 191, 197,
n. 103 (1930) erred in this respect. And the case which is
perhaps the turning point in the law on this subject,
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), similarly erred.
"The case of Uniled States v. Saline Bank, 1 Pet. 100,
So, Mr. President, I think that should be a part of the is not in conflict with this.... It is sufficient to say that
the prosecution was under a state law which imposed the
REcoRD so that anyone reading the proceedings will
know exactly the legislative history of the measure and penalty, and that thg Federal court was simply adthe opinion of the committee on that point." 99 CONG. ministering the state law, and no question arose as to
a prosecution under another jurisdiction."
REC. 4743 (1953) (remarks of Senator Kefauver).
A careful reding of the opinion in Saline Bank
In addition, the court in Tedesco conceded that the
words in the immunity bill being considered in that shows that this was no prosecution. It was rather, a bill
case were identical to those of the Compulsory Testi- in equity for discovery and relief filed by a United
mony Act of 1954 and "that Congress, in framing the States District Attorney on behalf of the United' States
Treasury to charge the stockholders of the bank with
immunity portions... used the exact phraseology...
with the intent that the words so used should receive liability for funds owed the Treasury by the bank.
the same construction." (Emphasis added.) And yet, Under the laws of Virginia, an unchartered bank like
the court in Tedesco construed that Act (a narcotic Saline was illegal, and the Attorney General of Virginia
immunity law) as not reaching to the state courts, could have brought suit in a state court to hold the
whereas the Supreme Court, in Ullmann, easily con- capital stock of the bank in trust for the commoncluded that the other Act did. This is hardly the "same wealth. The Court in Hale assumed that the proceeding
construction" that Congress was supposed to have in the federal court was one which could have been
brought under the law of Virginia outlined above.
intended.
The truth is that Congress made no rational choice It was not, and the case must be taken as authority for
as to whether or not immunity from state prosecution the proposition that a witness in a federal proceeding
should have been granted by the Compulsory Testi- is protected by the fifth amendment from incriminating
mony Act. The legislative history of the Act makes this himself under the laws of another jurisdiction.
161 U.S. 591 (1896).
clear. It is hardly any answer to say, therefore, that the
24The actual holding of Brown v.Walker on this
Murdock case was not decisive of the Ullmann case
because the Congress may undertake to give the witness point has been the subject of much confusion. Compare
Justice Frankfurter's statement on this point in
more than his due.
Ullmann, "We have already, in the name of the Com"9This is the rule laid down by Chief Justice Marshall
in the leading case of United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. merce *Clause, upheld a similar restriction on state
court jurisdiction, Brown v. Walker ....
" 350 U.S. at
Cas. 38 (No. 14,692e) (C.C.Va. 1807). An excellent
discussion of this case and others may be found in 436, with his dissent in United States v. Kahriger, 345
Ratner, Conseguences Of Exercising The Privilege U.S. 22, 39 (1953) where he said that Brown v. Walker
Against Self-Incrimination, 24 U. Cnr. L. REv. 472 held that the fifth amendment does not protect against
"the potential danger to that witness of possible
A1957).
20 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), The Queen
prosecution in a state court ......
25 Counsel for the witness claimed that in allegedly
v. Boyes, I B. & S.311, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (Q.B. 1861).
granting freight rebates in violation of the Interstate
2126 U.S. (IPet.) 100 (1828).
which led to the adoption of the Murdock rule
is in order.
-At the outset it must be understood that certain
general principles govern the plea of self-incrimination. The decision of whether or not an answer to
a particular question will incriminate a witness is
initially one for the court. If it decides that it is
possible for an answer to incriminate, depending
upon what the answer is, it is for the witness, and
the witness alone,' to then decide whether he will
answer the question 9 A second requirement is
that the danger of self-incrimination be a "real
and appreciable" one. The search for truth by the
courts cannot be blocked by a remote and unsubstantial fear of incrimination."
The first American case to raise the question of
whether the fifth amendment allows a witness in
a federal proceeding to refuse to answer a question
which might incriminate him under the laws of
another jurisdiction was United States v. Saline
Bank." In that case the United States sued the
stockholders of the bank, which was unchartered,
and hence illegal under the laws of Virginia, to
recover a sum of money due the U. S. treasury.
, The stockholders replied that any answers they
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The lower federal courts, in a series of bankruptcy cases decided before and after the Brown
case, applied the principle of Saline Bank and held
that witnesses testifying in federal proceedings
need not incriminate themselves under state law.26
Thus the law stood, without a dissent, when the
case of Jack v.Kansasn was decided by the
Commerce Act the witness, who was the auditor of a
railway company under investigation "might have
received moneys for this purpose and not have paid
them over, and thus have been guilty of embezzlement;
he might have paid them by a forged check, and thus
have been guilty of forgery, or he might have been guilty
of murder, or burglary, or arson, and a statement by
him to the effect that he paid the rebates at a certain
time and a certain place would have proved him to have
been present at that time and place .... All these would
be crimes against the State of Pennsylvania, and any
testimony given by him might be used to convict him
in the courts of that State." (Quotation from appellant's brief.) Grant, Immunity From Compulsory SelfIncrimination In A Federal System of Government, 9

TEMP. L. Q. 57- (1934). The fact that the Court in
Brown quoted from the Boyes case in dismissing the
witness's claim of possible incrimination under state
law supports the view that the Court regarded this
claim as groundless as a matter of fact, for Boyes is
the leading case in the law with regard to the substantiality, as a matter of fact, of self-incrimination pleas.
26In re Scott, 95 F. 815 (W. D. Penn. 1899) involved

the refusal of a witness to answer the questions of a
federal referee in bankruptcy on the ground that his
answers would incriminate him in a pending state
prosecution for fraudulent insolvency. His defense was
upheld.
In re Feldstein, 103 F. 269 (S.D. N. Y. 1900) a
witness refused to tell the referee the reasons for payments made to him by the bankrupt on the grounds
that his answers would incriminate him under the
gambling laws of New York.
In re Nachman, 114 F. 995 (D. C. S. C. 1902) a
similar plea was sustained.
In re Kanter, 117 F. 356 (S.D. N. Y. 1902) the
bankrupt was allowed to refuse an order for a production of papers and records which would have incriminated him in a pending state prosecution for larceny.
In re Hess, 134 F. 109 (E. D. Penn. 1905) the bankrupt refused to turn over books and papers which would
have incriminated him under contemplated state criminal proceedings. "Can he, then, be compelled to
deliver their possession for this purpose, if, perchance,
they contain evidence that may tend to incriminate
him, and which might subject him to a successful
criminal prosecution either in the federal or state
courts? The privilege here invoked is found in the

fifth amendment... ." (Emphasis added.) The court
then held that ". . . it is plain that whatever incriminat-

ing evidence the books may contain could be used without restriction in the state courts for the purpose of
convicting him of any crime for which he might be
indicted there, and, in consequence of this danger to
him, the plea of his constitutional privilege must prevail." 134 F. at 111-112.
In re Hooks Smelting Co., 138 F. 954 (E. D. Penn.
1905) the bankrupt's president refused to answer
questions would would have incriminated him in a
pending embezzlement prosecution under state law.
199 U.S. 372 (1905).
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Supreme Court in 1905. This case has been interpreted as applying an opposite rule from Saline
Bank and the law as enforced by the lower federal
courts at that time,2n but the case held nothing
more than that it was not a denial of due process
for Kansas to compel a witness to answer questions
relating to a violation of the state anti-trust laws
when the immunity he was given did not, and
constitutionally could not, extend to a possible
prosecution for violation of the federal anti-trust
laws. This was so, the Court held, because the
Supreme Court of Kansas had already held that
the witness could be asked no questions with
regard to interstatecommerce and there was no way,
therefore, that his answer could possibly, as a matter of fact, incriminate him under federal law. "We
do not believe that in such case there is any real
danger of a Federal prosecution .... " This case,
the Court said, was like Brown v. Walker where the
danger of incrimination under the laws of another
jurisdiction was, in fact, only a "bare possibility"
and so "impropable" that no notice would be
taken of it.
The Court then added a dictum which later
courts have seized upon to support their view thatJack adopted the "two sovereignties" rule, and
indeed, the statement on its face lends some credence to that view. "We think," the Court said,
"the legal immunity is in regard to a prosecution
in the same jurisdiction, and when that is fully
given it is enough." That this was not an adoption
of the "two sovereignties" rule may be seen by
reference to two things: (1) the Court specifically
refused to qualify Brown v. Walker,29 and (2) the
Supreme Court, in Ballmann v. Fagin,an opinion
written by Justice Holmes just one month after
the Jack case was decided, held that a witness in
a federal proceeding need not testify as to any
matter which might incriminate him under the
laws of another jurisdiction.n° The authority cited
2 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931);
Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1943).
2 "The principles underlying the provision itself
have beenthoroughly treated in the above cited cases
(one of which was Brown v. Walker) and it would be out
of place to here renew their discussion." 199 U.S. at
382.
30200 U.S. 186 (1906). This has been criticized as
dictum, but it was actually an alternative holding-and
by far the stronger one. See 200 U.S. at 195. The witness
in Ballmann specifically relied on Saline Bank. See
200 U.S. at 188. The government did not urge the
adoption of any "two sovereignties" rule. It merely
argued that the possibility of state incrimination was
remote as a matter of fact. Jack v. Kansas was not relied
upon by the government to support its position. See
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by Justice Holmes in support of his conclusion:
United States v. Saline Bank and Jack v. Kansas.
These conclusions stamp Jack as a "fact" casewhere the court will look to see if the feared incrimination under the laws of another jurisdiction
is possible, as a matter offact-rather than a "two
sovereignties" case-where the court will take no
notice of possible incrimination under another
jurisdiction's laws no matter how real the danger
of that prosecution may be.
Then came Hale v. Henkel,31 a case which marks
the turning point in the progress of the law from
Saline Bank, where the witness was protected, to
Murdock, where the "two sovereignties" rule was
adopted.32
•Hale was called by a federal grand jury to
testify concerning the affairs of a corporation, of
which he was an officer, then under investigation
for alleged violations of the Sherman Act. He
refused to testify on the ground, among others,
that his testimony would incriminate him. The
Court Ied that the federal immunity statute which
applied to the Sherman Act protected him and he
could be compelled to testify. The Court noted that
the immunity clause involved was the same as
that under consideration in Brown v. Walker and
that Hale's contention was foreclosed by the decision in that case.n This holding seemingly disposed
of all the witness's claims of incrimination, both

state and federal,3 but the Court then went on to
adopt the "two sovereignties" rule. The only
danger to be considered, the Court said, was that
arising under the laws of one sovereign.3 5
u justice Brewer, dissenting, said that he "fully
agreed" with the majority's proposition that "the
immunity granted by the Federal statute is sufficient
protection against both the Nation and the several
states. ..."

3 It may be contended that what the Court said
about "two sovereignties" was only dictum, but
regardless of this, it is submitted that be it dictum or
holding it was bad law. The defendant's counsel was of
the opinion that federal immunity would extend to the
state courts under the rule of Brown and Jack but
argued that such an extension was unconstitutional
under the tenth amendment. See 201 U.S. at 50. The
government relied on the Brown case and contended
that the witness was immune from state prosecution.
See 201 U.S. at 57 and Grant, supra note 24. Neither
side argued "two sovereignties" and both were clearly of
the opinion that there was no question of its application.
The Court, however, was of the opinion that the argument of possible incrimination under the laws of the
state where the federal investigatory body was sitting
was unsound. "Indeed, if the argument were a sound
one it might be carried still further and held to apply
not only to state prosecutions within the same jurisdiction, but to prosecutions under the criminal laws of
other States to which the witness might have subjected
himself." This was a clear repudiation of Ballmann v.
Fagin, where the state incrimination feared was that
under the laws of Ohio-the state in which the federal
grand jury in that case was sitting. Curiously enough,
Justice Holmes, who wrote the opinion in Ballmann did
not dissent in Hale v. Henkd.
"The question has been fully considered in England,
and the conclusion reached by the courts of that country that the only danger to be considered is one arising
200 U.S. at 192. If the Jack case had indeed adopted the within the same jurisdiction and under the same
"two sovereignties" rule the government would surely 'sovereignty. Queen v. Boyes, I B. & S. 311; King of
have cited that case as it would then have had a con- the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 7 State Trials (N.S.), 1049,
clusive answer to the witness's contention rather than 1068; State v. March, 1 Jones (N. Car.) 526; State v.
Thomas, 98 N. Car. 599."
one which depended upon a question of fact.
Queen v. Boyes is no authority for the "two sov2 201 U.S. 43 (1906). The case is most famous for its
holding that a corporation cannot plead the privilege ereignties" rule. Far from it, is the leading case for the
proposition that incrimination feared must be subagainst self-incrimination.
stanial in fact and underles the Saline Bank, Brown,
2 "Not until this court pronounced judgment in
United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, had it been Jack, and Ballmann cases.
Queen v. Boyes was a bribery prosecution. The governdefinitely settled that one under examination in a
federal tribunal could not refuse to answer on account ment called as a witness one of the election officials
of probable incrimination under state law." United bribed by the defendant. He refused to testify on the
ground of self-incrimination. The government then
Statis v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933).
m"Appellant also invokes the protection of the procured a pardon for the witness. He still declined to
Fifth Amendment.... The answer to this is found in a testify, however, on the ground that, while the pardon
proviso to the General Appropriation Act of February stayed all ordinary legal proceedings, it did not protect
25, 1903, 32 Stat. 854, 904, that 'no person shall be him against a possible impeachment proceeding in the
prosecuted.. ." The court then applied the principle of House of Commons. This fear, said the court, was
the Brown case which, it will be remembered, extended simply ridiculous.
"Now, in the present case, no one seriously supposes
the bar of prosecution to the state courts. "We need
not state the reasons given in Brown v. Walker, both that the witness runs the slightest risk of an impeachin the opinion of the court, and in the dissenting opinion, ment by the House of Commons. No instance of such a
wherein all the prior authorities were reviewed, and a proceeding in the unhappily too numerous cases of
conclusion reached by a majority of that court, which bribery which have engaged the attention of the
fully covers the case under consideration." (Emphasis House of Commons has every occurred, or, so far as we
added.) It will also be remembered that the Court in the are aware, has ever been thought of.... (This proseBrown case dismissed the witness's claim of possible cution) was undertaken by the Attorney General by
state prosecution only because it was, in fact, not a the direction of the House itself .... It appears to us,
therefore, that the witness in this case was not, in a
substantial one.
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The Supreme Court may have adopted the "two
sovereignties" rule in Hale but the lower federal
courts went right on deciding cases as if they had
never heard of that decision. Pleas of possible
incrimination under the laws of another jurisdicton
were continually sustained on the Saline Bank and
Ballman principles until the very eve of the Murdock decision.3 6 Moreover, the Supreme Court
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itself was apparently unsure of the correctness of
the decision in Hae for it specifically left the question open in a case decided some twenty one years.
laterY
Efforts have been made to reconcile Hale with
the earlier cases of Saline Bank and Baflmann by
pointing out that the witness in Hale was, afterall, in no real danger of state prosecution and it.
cannot be said that the Court in Hale would havedecided the case the way it did if there had been a.
substantial danger of incrimination under statelaw.w This theory, even if accepted as true, is.
unavailing however, because the Murdock decision:
squarely applies the "two sovereignties" rule to a.
case where the danger of incrimination under thelaw of the state was very great. In fact, the answersto the questions asked would probably have been
enough, standing alone, to convict him of a crimein the state courts. 39
This analysis of the federal cases reveals, there-

rational point of view, in any the slightest real danger
from the evidence he was called upon to give when
protected by the pardon from all ordinary legal proceedings; and that it was therefore the duty of the
presiding Judge to compel him to answer." 121 Eng.
Rep. at 738.
It is true that the King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox,
1 Simon (n.s.) 301, 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (Ch. 1851)
supports the "two sovereignties" rule. It must be noted,
however, that the result was reached only because of
decisive factual considerations in the case. The witness
refused to testify on the ground that his answers would
incriminate him under the laws of Sicily. The court
held this to be no bar.
"... [Ifn the absence of all authority on the point, that
the rule of protection is confined to what may tend to
subject a party to penalties by our own laws ...... of prostitution. Immunity from federal prosecution was.
offered to those complying with the regulation provi(Emphasis added.) 61 Eng. Rep. at 128.
In this case the specific laws of Sicily which the sions. The court held that the defendant did not have
witness feared were not pointed out to the court. The to register because to do so would have subjected her to
witness merely alleged that he would be "subject to possible prosecution under a law of the state of Washcriminal prosecution, punishment, and penalties in ington which forbade the maintenance of a house of
Sicily." This lack of evidence as to the specific laws of prostitution. This decision was affirmed on another
the other jurisdiction involved was probably fatal, as ground by the Supreme Court in United States v.
the court pointed out in such a case "No judge can Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73 (1916). It is interesting to note
know, as a matter of law, what would or what would that four Justices who participated in the Lombardo
not be penal in a foreign country, and he cannot, there- decision were also members of the Court which decided
fore, form any judgment as to the force or truth of the Hale v. Henkel. The effect of this affirmance, of course,
objection of a witness when he declines to answer on was to leave standing a lower court decision, one
such a ground." Moreover, the court said, there was no ground of which was contrary to Hale.
Pleas of possible state prosecution were also upheld.
obligation on the part of the defendants to subsequently
In re Gasteiger, 290 F. 410 (E. D. N. Y. 1923) and in
subject themselves to the jurisdiction of Sicily.
Authority on this point was not long in coming. And Buckeye Powder Co. v. Hazard Powder Co., 205 F.
when it came it overruled King of the Two Sicilies. In 827 (D. C. Conn. 1913).
In re Doyle, 42 F.2d 686 (S. D. N. Y. 1930), decided
United States of America v. McRae [1867] L.R. 3 Eq.
79, the court upheld the refusal of a witness in an Eng- one year before the Murdock case, a similar plea was
lish court to answer any questions when the answers upheld. The court discussed the prior Supreme Court
might subject property belonging to the witness, and decisions. In Brown v. Walker, it said, the immunity
situated in the United States, to forfeiture under the extended to the state courts. The same was true of
laws of that country. While the court recognized that Hale v. Henkel and the apparent adoption by the Suthe King case might have been correctly decided on its preme Court of the "two sovereignties" rule was
peculiar facts, it specifically disapproved of any general dictum. Jack v. Kansas was a "fact" case. The court
would follow Ballmann and Saline Bank.
application of the "two sovereignties" rule.
3 United States ex rel Vajtauer v. Commissioner of
The question had indeed been "fully considered" in
England but the "conclusion reached by the courts of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927).
38 See Rogge, supra at note 3.
that country" was exactly contrary to the "two
The lower court opinion in this case, United States
sovereignties" rule laid down in Hale v. Henkel.
The two North Carolina cases cited by the Court v. Murdock, 51 F.2d 389, 391 (S. D. Ill. 1930) makes
may be similarly dealt with. The first, State v. March, this clear.
"The witness admitted he had been interested in the
46 N.C. 526 (1854) is a "two sovereignties" case, but
the later case decided by the North Carolina Supreme operation of slot machines in Madison county; that he
Court, State v. Thomas, 98 N.C. 599 (1887) expressly had paid money to certain persons, which he had derejected the "two sovereignties" rule of the March ducted as an expense of his business in the income tax
case and declined to follow it.
The rule had been re- returns. The inference is quite clear that this money was
pudiated in North Carolina, therefore, before it was paid to cettain persons to procure protection from criminal prosecution by reason of defendant's illegal entercited as good authority by Hale.
36In United States v. Lombardo, 228 F. 980 (W. D. prises. The witness was asked to give the names of the
Wash. 1915) the defendant was prosecuted for failure persons to whom the money was given, and the purpose
to register the names of alien women kept for purposes for which it was given."
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fore, that prior to the Murdock decision, not one
federal court, including the Supreme Court, had
ever forced a witness in a federal proceeding to
incriminate himself under state law when the
danger of state incrimination was substantial.
Murdock stands alone.
Legal comment was, on the whole, favorable to
the Murdock case,40 and Wigmore's wholehearted
support of the "two sovereignties" rule was undoubtedly a factor here.' In the twentyone years
since the decision was made, however, the "two
4
sovereignties" rule has come under sharp attack.
The latest decisions of the state courts construing state immunity statutes have repudiated
the rule in Murdock and have returned to the fact
test of Jack v. Kansas.4 This trend is significant,
40
Note, 45
41

HARv. L. Ruv. 595 (1932).
Wigmore pointed out that "In Samoa it was tabooed to name a deceased chieftain by the title he bore
when living" and in Massachusetts "to sell cigars on
Sunday" was once a crime. "Are the Courts of our
various Commonwealths to ... catalogue within the
rubrics of criminality every act which is anywhere,
under, any system of manners, morals, or policy,
stigmatized by law?" he asked. 8 WIGmorE, EVIDENCE
§ 2258
(3rd Ed. 1940).
4
2Rogge, Compelling The Testimony Of Political
Deviants, 55 Micn. L. REv. 163, (1957), and see Grant,
Immunity From Compulsory "Self-IncriminationIn A
FederalSystem Of Government, 9 Txm,. L. Q. 57 (1934),
Grant, Federalismand Self-Incrimination,4,5 U. C. L. A.
L. REv. 549, 1 (1957-58), by an author who has been
the voice crying in the wilderness against the "two
sovereignties"
doctrine for twenty-three years.
4
3Doran v. Doran, 215 La. 151, 39 So.2d 894 (1949)
distinguishes the federal authority on a fact basis.
Adopts the fact test of Jack.
In re Carchietta, 124 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1953) says the
Murdock rule is in effect in New York except when the
defendant can "substantiate his claim by evidence that
the danger of prosecution is not remote and unsubstantial, but real and substantial. He may show this by
evidence of the commencement, or the actual pendency,
of a criminal prosecution in a foreign jurisdiction, or
by other equally cogent evidence."
People v. Den Uyl, 318 Mich. 645, 29 N.W.2d 284
(1947).
"We are of the opinion that the privilege against selfincrimination exonerates from disclosure whenever there
is a probability of prosecution in State or federal
jurisdictions.... It seems like a travesty on verity to
say that one is not subjected to self-incrimination when
compelled to give testimony in a State judicial proceeding which testimony may forthwith be used against
him in a Federal criminal prosecution." 29 N.W.2d at
287.
State ex rel Mitchell v. Kelly, - Fla., 71 S.2d
887 (1954) decides the question for the first time in
Florida and follows the Den Uyl case.
The latest state case is Commonwealth v. Rhine,
303 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Ky. 1957).
"We believe that to render effective the ...

Consti-

tutional provision against self-incrimination, it is
essential that it apply to prosecutions by the United
States as well as those by the Commonwealth. To hold

because it was essentially for the protection of the
state courts and state immunity statutes that the
Murdock rule was intende&"
The question of the soundness of the "two
sovereignties" rule is an important one today.
Whatever may have been said in support of the
rule in the past is open to question today when
federal investigations are likely to have as one of
their objects the speciic purpose of exposing violations of state criminal law. The Kefauver Committee investigation of a few years ago is an example.
The Committee's authorizing resolution gave it
authority to "make a full and complete study and
investigation of whether organized crime utilizes
the facilities of interstate commerce... in furtherance of any transactions which are in violation of
the law.., of the state in which the transactions
occur ....

45

One lower federal court has sought to escape
from the harsh results of an application of the
Murdock rule in these circumstances. United Stales
46
v. DiCarlo
was a contempt of Congress prosecution. The defendant had been a witness before the
Kefauver Committee and had been asked questions concerning violations of state criminal lawY
He refused to answer the questions. The government cited the Murdock rule in DiCarlo's contempt
trial but the district court distinguished MuLrdock.
The Supreme Court had specifically pointed out in
that case that nothing of state concern was involved, that the questions were in relation to
federal income tax matters, and that while the
answers might have incriminated the witness
under state law they did so only incidentally.This
was not the case in DiCarlo,said the district court,
otherwise would be to ignore the fact that our citizens
are in a very real sense, as well as in a technical one,
citizens of both the State of Kentucky and of the
United States. The jurisdiction of both governments is
coextensive."
See the favorable comments on this case: Recent
Cases, 106 U. PA. L. Ruv. 127 (1957), Recent Cases,
11 VAND L. REv. 199 (1957), Recent Cases, 46 Ky.L. J.
281 (1958).
4The argument is-that no state could enact a valid
immunity law if the "two sovereignties" rule were not
recognized because no state can constitutionally give
immunity against federal prosecution. Jack v. Kansas,
200 U.S. 186 (1905). The state cases construing the
state immunity statutes have held, however, that only
those specific questions which may lead to federal
incrimination are bad.
45 S.REs. 202, 81st Cong., 2d Ses., 96 CONG. Rxc.
6246 (1950).
'4 102 F.'Supp. 597 (N. D. Ohio 1952).
47Whether or not he had engaged in the slot machine
and gambling businesses in New York. -

CRrMINAL LAW COMMENTS AND ABSTRACTS

for there the questions were specifically directed to
offenses against state law. The witness was acquitted of contempt.41
The DiCarlo decision has been criticized as an
attempt by the district court to overrule the Murdock case;49 it has also been praised as a just and
logical exception to the Murdock rule.w The difference between the situation in Murdock and that in
DiCarlo is more apparent than real. If the "two
sovereignties" rule is sound it should make no
difference in law whether the question is specifically directed at a disclosure of a violation of state
law or the violation is only elicited incidentally in
an answer to a question primarily concerning a
federal matter.
To say that a case is founded on a misapprehension of earlier cases and finds support only in the
dictum of some of them, while it may weakefi the
force of the case, does not destroy it or prove its
incorrectness. The Supreme Court was free, in the
Murdock case, to adopt the "two sovereignties"
rule if it saw fit to do so. Any further criticism of
that case must involve, therefore, an examination
of the merits of the rule. These have been considered, to some extent, in the previous discussion.
The strongest argument that may be mustered
in support of the Murdock rule is that federal
investigations should not be hampered by matters
depending upon the criminal laws of the fortyeight states. This is not a valid argument, however,
and the proof of it may be seen in the fact that
the Murdock rule is not being enforced at the federal
investigative level today. Witnesses appearing before
the McClellan Committee, a committee of the
United States Congress engaged in an investigation of improper activities in the labor and management field, have refused to testify and have invoked the fifth amendment on the grounds that
any answers they might give would incriminate
them under various state criminal laws. Most were
then under indictment in state courts. These
refusals were upheld by the Committee and its
counsel."
Is"In the light of its facts and the reasoning of the
court, the binding effect of the Murdock case cannot be
extended to cases, where, in the exercise of the overlapping jurisdiction of the Federal government, a Congressional committee enters upon investigations of state
crimes. But in the search for the principle that ought to
govern in such cases, United States v. Saline Bank,
supra, may be accepted as a guide." 102 F. Supp. at
605.
49 Comment, 4 STAN.L. Rxv. 594 (1952).
6 Note, 66 HAnv. L. REv. 186 (1952).
51Analytical Report, The McClellan Committee

[Vol. 49

It is unjust to require a witness under the jurisdiction of the federal government to incriminate
himself under state law when a witness cannot be
subject to federal jurisdiction without being subject, at the same time, to the jurisdiction of a
state. Federal investigations nowadays are often
specifically directed at violations of state criminal
laws. Federal and state prosecutors work hand in
hand when a criminal case presents both federal
and state aspects.u Under these circumstances,
it is indeed a "traversty on verity" to say that a
witness has received the full protection of the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination when he has been granted immunity from
federal prosecution alone."
Hearing-1957, The Bureau of National Affairs,
Inc. (1958).
At p. 5: "Maloney explained that his reason for
refusing to answer questions was that he is under
indictment in Washington on charges of violating state
laws and conspiracy to violate them."
At p. 12: "The second alleged conspirator summoned to testify was Joseph P. McLaughlin, identified
by the Committee as a Seattle gambler... He invoked
the Fifth and 14th Amendments when asked if the
Teamster Union ever paid any of his bills, explaining
that he is under indictment on 'eight or nine' counts in
Portland charging gambling and conspiracy."
At p. 92: "All refused to answer questions on the
ground that they are under criminal indictment in
Lackawanna County on charges allegedly arising out
of union activity."
Like the Kefauver investigation, specific violations of
state law were apparently being sought by the Committee in some instances. The authorizing resolution
provided that "there is hereby established a select
committee which is authorized and directed to conduct
an investigation and study of the extent to which
criminal or other improper practices or activities are,
or have been engaged in the field of labor-management
relations...." S. REs. 74, 85, Cong., 1st Sess., 103
CONG. REc. 1264 (1957).

Appendix 10 at p. 449: "The Committee has thus
far determined that there are at least 11 fields of major
investigation that should be covered. They are:.. (6)
"
Extortion and robbery... (8) Violence. ...
52 A federal grand jury in Chicago was investigating
an alleged attempt to bribe a federal official. A Chicago
municipal judge was called as a witness before the grand
jury and reportedly invoked the fifth amendment. When
the federal grand jury returned a no bill the federal
district attorney, Robert Tieken, announced that "I
will turn over everything we have to the State's
Attorney's office." The State's Attorney for Cook
County said he would receive the evidence and documents and that "If it means what I think it does, I'll
take it to the county grand jury."
The county grand jury later indicted the witness. See
Chicago Daily Tribune, October 18, 1957, pt. 1, p. 9,
and October 19, 1957 pt. 1, p. 4.
53 See Marcello v. United States, 196 F.2d 437, 442
(5th Cir. 1952). "The doctrine (two sovereignties) is so
strongly entrenched that it appears as futile to protest
as it is to expect an individual to feel that his constitu-
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Much confusion has resulted in these cases from
attempts to apply the self-incrimination provision
of the fifth amendment to state action or to bring
it in the back door through the fourteenth. The
first has been unavailing since Barron v. Baltimore," and the second was rejected in Twining v.
New Jersey.n
A recent case illustrates the difficulties which
notions of "federalism" and "two sovereignties"
have caused in this field. In Knapp v. Schweitzer'8
the petitioner was a witness before a state grand
jury. He was offered immunity from state prosecution. He refused to answer questions for fear of
incrimination under federal law, claiming the
privilege of the fifth amendment. This same argument was put forward and rejected in Jack v.
Kansas. This was recognized by Justice Frankfurter, speaking from the majority,- but he also
seized upon the chance to add, in dictum, that
"The sole-although deeply valuable purpose
of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination is the security of the indivudial
against the exertion of the power of the Federal
government to compel incriminating testimony
with a view to enabling that same Government to
convict a man out of his own mouth." (Emphasis
added.)
The first part of this statement, that the fifth
amendment binds only the federal government,
is undoubtedly correct;- the second part, that
the government which compels must be the same
as that which convicts finds no support in the language of the Constitution. 59
Justice Frankfurter then re-affirms'0 the Murdock doctrine:
tional privilege has been safeguarded because the
penitentiary into which his answer may land him is
under the supervision of the state instead of the federal
government."
"32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
' 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
"78 Sup. Ct. 1302 (1958).
5 "This cannot be denied on the claim that such
state law of immunity may expose the potential witness
to prosecution under federal law. See Jack v. Kansas,
199 U.S. 372." 78 Sup. Ct. at 1307.
8Barron v.Baltimore, footnote 54 supra.
6"Certainly there is nothing in the language nor in
the history of the Constitutional provisions which dic
tates an answer either way upon the question whether
the protection should extent to prosecution under
'foreign' law. Judges who consider that the policy
behind the privilege is so salutary that the range of its
application should be extended, will be inclined to
accord protection when the danger of 'foreign' prosecution is clear." McCoRmicic, EVIDENCE § 124 (1954).
6Though this re-affirmance is certainly dictum.

"If a person may, through immunized selfdisclosure before a law-enforcing .agency of the
state, facilitate to some extent his amenability to
federal process, or vice versa, this too is a price to
be paid for our federalism." (Emphasis added.)
But this vice versa argument of federalism ignores
several basic points. It is true that a state does
not have to provide immunity from federal prosecution. But this is only true because a state cannot
provide such immunity,6t and because a state does
not have to provide any privilege against selfincrimination, 62 and even if it does it may construe its grant not to recognize the possibility of
incrimination under another jurisdiction, for a
state court is, after all, the final arbiter of what its
own privilege against self-incrimination encompasses. This argument does not apply in reverse,
however, as those who weave the magic spell of
federalism would have it do. The federal government can provide immunity from state prosecutions,6 and the federal government must recognize
the privilege against self-incrimination." How far
that privilege then extends becomes a policy
question, not a constitutional one which the
"essence of a constitutionally formulated federalism" compels.
Murdock, by his testimony before a federal
agency, did not merely "facilitate to some extent
his amenability to state process." He was obliged
to give testimony that would, in fact, be enough to
secure his conviction in a state court. 65 If this is
the "price to be paid for our federalism," then,
under our present federal and state criminal
investigatory "and prosecution procedures, it is
submitted that the price is too high.
It is hoped that the Supreme Court will soon
have occasion to examine once more the validity
of the "two sovereignties" rule, a rule which finds
support neither in the language of the Constitution
nor in reason and justice, and that the Court will
see fit to abandon once and for all a rule which
ignores the realities of a twentieth century
America."
61

U.S. CoNsT. art. 6, § 2.
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 243 (1908).
6Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), Ullmann
v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
6"U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
"See footnote 38, supra and Feldman v. United
States,
322 U.S. 487 (1944).
66
An examination of the concurring and dissenting
opinions in Xnapp v. Schweitzer, 78 Sup. Ct. 1302
(1958) indicates that at least the four votes required for
certiorari will be available in any case which provides
the basis for a re-appraisal of the Murdock doctrine.
6Twining

